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The Strategy that Gave Independence
to the U.S.
We celebrate this year our nation's "birthday,"
but 1976 is also the bicentennial of what General
Washington, a master of understatement, as
well as, as we shall see, a master of strategy,
called an "unhappy predicament."
The
c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f ' s s o l u t i o n t o the
predicament was the strategy that won the
war, and put the United States on the way
towards being a real country. This solution
was the thoroughgoing adoption of Fabian
strategy. Looking into what this was, and how
Washington made i t work, permits a better
appreciation of Washington's real stature in
military history.
The pragmatic genius who gave his name
to the strategy was Q. Fabius Maximus, who
was also given the name Cunctator, for slander
and opprobrium when the issue was in doubt,
for honor afterwards. It meant Delayer. In
217 B. C. Hannibal had already made himself
master of all Spain, had already crossed the
Alps with his army and a cavalry that included
trained war elephants, and had already
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destroyed a Roman army a t Lake Trasimenus.
Rome's immediate reaction was to appoint
Fabius Dictabor. On taking the field, he laid
down a simple and immutable plan of action:
He avoided all direct encounter with the enemy;
moved his camp from highland to highland,
where Hannibal's Numidian and Spanish
cavalry could n o t follow; a n d watched
Hannibal's movements w i t h u n r e l a x i n g
vigilance, looking for opportunities. Most of
these opportunities were simply chances to chip
away a t Hannibal's strength by cutting off
stragglers or the details constantly being sent
away from the main body to forage for supplies.
His idea, in the smooth words of Plutarch, was
"to let the force and vigour of Hannibal waste
away and expire, like a flame, for want of the
aliment." Against a superior force overseas from
its home base, this made great good sense. And
this constant avoidance of battle, which could
more accurately be called watchful opportunism
than retreat, led after a few months to the
entrapment of Hannibal's main force in the
vqley of the Vulturnus (now the Voltorno)
River. Seeing that the water and good pasturage
of the upper valley had drawn Hannibal into a
jar, Fabius, using his superior knowledge of
the territory, quickly descended to Hannibal's
rear with 4,000 men to seal the opening, leaving
other forces upon the heights on both sides.
This could have been decisive, but Hannibal,
boxed in a s much by his own blunder a s by
Fabius's watchfulness, was capable of making
up for error with stratagem. The cattle, which
ancient armies generally kept around for the
sake of keeping the meat fresh, could in
darkness be made to pass for an armed force.
He had torches and bundles of dry twigs and
branches tied to their horns. After nightfall,
these were lit, and Hannibal's soldiers drove
them up one of the enclosing mountain ridges.
The c a t t l e a d v a n c e d calmly, t h e a n c i e n t
historians say, until the fires burned down to
quick. The cattle then stampeded, and the
Romans were stampeded from enough of the
ridge to pass an army through.
The thing that set Fabius apart from his
fellow Romans and fellow generals was that
he could learn from experience, even other
people's experience, so much faster than anyone
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else. Fabius knew how to win a set battle: he
had already been awarded a triumph for
defeating the Ligurians that way, and driving
them back to the Alps. But i t only took one
Trasimenus to teach Fabius that this was not
the way to fight Hannibal: 15,000 Roman
soldiers killed, and 15,000 more taken prisoner,
were to Fabius a clear lesson. Lucius Minucius
was slower to see, and so was the dissatisified
Roman public: they gave Lucius, Fabius's
second in command, equal authority, with the
understanding that he would go out there and
win the war. He went out there and fought a
battle on the first opportunity, which was a
trap : Hannibal, knowing Lucius' eagerness,
had hidden part of his force in a plain which,
though riven with gullies and ditches, seemed
level from a distance. Then a t dawn, in full
sight of L. Minucius, he sent a detachment up
to take the hill overlooking it. Minucius
swallowed the bait. He attacked the detachment,
first with cavalry and a few troops, then, as
the engagement was constantly requiring more
and more force, with his whole army. I t was
a complete encirclement, and would have meant
the complete loss of yet another Roman army
had not Fabius arrived in time to cut open an
escape route. Lucius Minucius learned his
lesson, and openly, abjectly, submitted himself
and his army to the command of Fabius.
The dictatorship having come to its half-year
term, Fabius lay down his command, and new
consuls were chosen who continued his policy
of wearing out the enemy while avoiding
disaster. Meanwhile, there arose a politician
who was becoming popular by declaiming that
as long as Rome fielded generals like Fabius,
the war would continue: Rome must send out
a general who would march out there and win
it. This second Minucius was named Varro.
He won election, and what he marched out
to was that eternal landmark in the history
of defeat: Cannae. It is now the name of a
classic in tactics, for one still speaks of a
"Cannae encirclement." Just as in a duel,
where the challenged party may choose the
weapons, Hannibal was able, once again faced
with a Roman General eager for battle, to
choose the situation under which the battle
would be fought. Varro, confident in his new
levy of 88,000 men, twice the number of the
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enemy, set up the red battle ensign the first
dawn after closing, a t Cannae. Hannibal
marched his men around to have a position
upwind of the Roman army, so all the dust
in marching and later in fighting would be
blown into the eyes of the Romans. Further,
he weakened his center, placing his worst and
weakest there, reserving his best troops for the
wings. The Roman forces attacked, drove the
enemy before them a t the center, but made no
progress a t either right or left wing, so their
final formation before the massacre was a
perfect half moon, surrounded, compressed. It
was reported that 50,000 were slain and 14,000
taken prisoner. The Roman eagerness to finish
the war, gambling almost everything on the
event of a single day, actually extended the
war: winning i t took fourteen more years.
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only object became to hold his ground in the
south until his brother Hasdrubal should appear
in the n:orth with fresh forces. But when
Hasdrubal finally came in 207, the Roman
consular army faced him and beat him.
Hannibal was so stricken with the loss of
his hopes that he abandoned all thought of
offensive, and merely held on for four years,
contracting his forces into the wild mountains
of Bruttium, the region of the "toe" of the
Italian "boot." What brought him out, of
course, was that Scipio, the grown son of the
first Roman General Hannibal ever entrapped,
circled and destroyed, had marshalled the nerve
to take the war to Carthage, and now (late 203)
had to be faced in North Africa.

In sum, Hannibal faced eight generals in
Italy,
over a space of fifteen years. A tactical,
Before Cannae, Hannibal's force led an
though
perhaps not a strategic, genious, he
outlaw existence with tenuous supply. This
entrapped
and imposed disaster on all of them,
stunning victory opened to him the resources
but
not
Fabius.
of all southern Italy; even Capua, second
largest and richest city of all Italy, submitted
Did G e n e r a l W a s h i n g t o n k n o w a l l t h i s ?
to Hannibal's leadership. Cannae led also to
Unless I've overlooked it, there is not one word
an alliance with Philip V, king of Macedon, and
in the twenty-eight large volumes of his
to the election, in Syracuse, of Hannibal's
collected writings to show that he did. My own
agents as generals. The total cost, then, of the
conclusion is that he arrived a t the Fabian
Roman one-day gamble near the little town of
position by his own independent wisdom, and
Cannae on the Adriatic, was southern Italy,
good judgement of the circumstances of 1776.
Sicily, and Macedon. It should also have cost
He was told about Fabius in '78, long after
them the war.
he had already determined on the Fabian
That it did not was partly because Hannibal principle and was holding onto it with calm,
unaccountably did not march on Rome, and despite all complaints of dilatory cowardice,
partly because. Fabius calmed the Romans, despite the attempts to have him replaced with
averted panic, and, with what had been some such hot, eager Minucius as Horatio
condemned as fear and cowardice now Gates, even despite the modern historians who,
recognized as wisdom, again took the helm. not knowing about Fabius either, fail to
With everyone now aware that repudiation of appreciate his retreats, caution, and slow,
his policies had meant Cannae, he persevered patient ways.
in them. Rome never again opposed one single
The situation that had called for the original
large army to Hannibal in Italy, but stifled his
Fabian
tactics, of course, was that one was
movements with two or more smaller ones.
faced
with
a superior enemy who, if you
Though he came out the winner in numerous
opposed
him
in the open in a frontal attack,
engagements, even trapping and destroying
could
destroy
your force in a day (even if he
Marcellus, Fabius' usual colleague in the
to do after the victory), but
didn't
know
what
consulship and his fellow-commander, in 208,
whose
weakness
was
the logistical fact that he
Hannibal gradually became more and more
was
overseas
from
his
ultimate source of supply.
weakened. Fabius was always there, but yet
Quite
beside
the
obvious
parallels, the situation
Hannibal could never trap him. Yet he always
States
of
America was rather
for
the
United
had to be dealt with. Eventually, Hannibal's
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worse: Unlike the Rome of 218, the United
States of 1776 could not afford to lose 64,000
fighting men in a single day. Washington
certainly knew that.
The very surprising thing is that he seems
for several years to be the only American
who did. As one examines the years of the
Revolution, this becomes very clear. But before
one could hope to see the situation through
Washington's eyes i t is necessary to look a t
what the "United States of America" actually
was in '76, the more so since '76 is taken as
the nation's birthday.
1776 made us not a country, but a group
which would, given the successful conclusion
of seven more years of war, still only be
thirteen separate but allied states. The alliance
was defined by the Articles of Confederation,
which actually were based on the military needs
of 1754! I n that year a gentlemen's agreement
of alliance among the colonies seemed
prospectively useful with a view to wars with
the French and Indians. So Ben Franklin
produced one. It was rejected, but later formed
the basis of the Articles, which were started
in 1776. These formed the basis for Congress's
actions as if adopted, but were not even fully
ratified until March of 1781. Though Article
One said "The Style of this Confederacy shall
be the United States of America," the next
defined the Confederacy as a "firm league of
friendship." In short, no Constitution, no
country. Under the Articles, taxation there
was none, but the power to make requisitions
on the states; executive there was none, but
the power in Congress to "appoint such
committees and officers as may be necessary
for managing the general affairs"; judicial
branch there was none, but in the Congress
was the "last resort in disputes and differences
between the States." The States, in short, were
countries, the United States a United Nations,
each with not a governor, in the modern sense
of that word, but a head of state. Ben Franklin
was, for illustration, President of Philadelphia.
It was such a hopeless and non-working
league that it couldn't even pay an army.
Nobody appreciated this better than the
Commander-in-Chief. Washington's full-time
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clothed as they ought to be. In short, my
situation has been such that I have been
obliged to use a r t to conceal i t from my officers."
That was Washington's 1776. Though acutely
aware that his available scope of action was
limited, he was even then planning the attack
on occupied Boston. The plan was ingeniously
Fabian, and completely effective. Though the
British had strongly fortified Boston, they had
left Dorchester Heights vacant. The heights
commanded the harbour as well as the city,
and Washington took them a n d began
bombardment. The Admiral of the British fleet
informed General Howe that he would not keep
the King's ships in the harbour while
Washington held the heights. A detachment
was sent to dislodge the Continental forces, but
was repulsed. That Washington was on the
heights to stay meant that Howe had to leave
Boston or lose the support of the fleet. He
abandoned Boston March 17, taking 11,000
soldiers with him back to Halifax. Washington,
it is clear, had a very good talent for seeing
and making use of available opportunities, and
for grasping basic principles.
The private letter setting out Washington's
1776 shows it, expounding a large part of his
constant and successful strategy as well a s
the difficulties of the situation: (1) to hide
inability to act lest the exposure of it lead to
attack and annihilation even if hiding weakness
lead to ridicule for inaction, and (2) never
permit anything to become the all-or-nothing
gamble. He expounded a third basic part of
his strategy tm years later in a letter to a
chastened Lafayette, who had already learned
the wisdom of it in the field. The incident
leading to the letter is demonstrative proof that
Washington's Fabian tactics were (1) not
recognized as such in North America, and (2)
that the need for them was not recognized in
North America. I suggest that the reason the
need was not recognized, and thus that the
strategy itself was not recognized as Fabian,
and defended as such, was Washington's not
spe2king in his own defense.
The demonstration is that early in 1778,
the United States of America in Congress
assembled voted to attack Canada. This had
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already been attempted in '75. Lafayette, a n
eager volunteer and a Marquis, but also a n
impetuous youth of 21, was to be in charge.
On his arrival in New York to take command,
he found 960 12-year-olds and 60-year-olds and
in betweens. No army, even he realized, with
which to complete the march, much less to
mount an offensive. He begged off, which
Washington was perfectly happy to permit him,
but also asked leave for a lesser coup, "a
diversion against New York." Washington's
reply (10 March, '78) is the key to the strategy
which won the war. "The expedition which you
hint a t would be inadvisable in our present
circumstances. Anything in the way of formal
attack, which would necessarily be announced
to the enemy by preparatory measures, would
not be likely to succeed. If a stroke is
premeditated in that quarter, i t must be
effected by troops stationed a t the proper
distance for availing themselves of the first
opportunity afforded by the enemy. This
therefore must rather be the effect of time
and chance, than premeditation." Washington
was a constant and successful practitioner of
the advice he gave eager subordinates. Two of
his best-known successes stemmed from
surprise turnarounds from what had been
thought to be retreat. Driven out of New York
by 20,000 British soldiers, and retreating in
the van of the British advance through New
Jersey to Philadelphia, he suddenly turned upon
Lt. C1. Rall's advanced corps of Hessians Dec.
26. This, of course, is known as the "Crossing
of the Delaware." He repeated this brilliant
exploit Jan. 3, blinding Cornwallis with
campfires, nightmarching to his rear, and
surprising three British regiments and three
companies of light cavalry a t Princeton, and
only then encamping for the winter.
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gone near the battle of Freeman's F a r m October
7, a battle which was, in fact, won by the
unauthorized leadership and unsurpassed
bravery of Benedict Arnold, who had already
been relieved of command by Gates! How does
Washington fit in? Informed that Generals
Lincoln and Schuyler had in mind to unite
the militia to the continental force in frontal
opposition to the advancing Burgoyne, the
Commander-in-Chief advised : "If this is really
the intention, I should think it a very ineligible
plan. An Enemy can always act with more
vigor and effort when they have nothing to
apprehend for their flanks and rear, than
when they have, and, it is one of the most
approved and most universally practiced
Manoeuvres of War, to keep their fears
continually awake on these accounts, and, when
circumstances permit, to be actually in condition
to give them Serious Annoyance in those Parts.
Independent of the Inconveniences that attend
a situation, where the Rear and Flank are
constantly exposed to the insults of light
parties which may be a t every moment
harassing them; the necessity of never losing
sight of the means of a secure retreat, which
ought t o be the first object of an Officer's care,
must be exceedingly embarrassing where there
is a Force in such a position as to endanger
it. If a respectable body of men were to be
stationed on the Grants, it would undoubtedly
have the effects intimated above, would render
it not a little diffifficult for Mr. Bourgoigne t o
keep the necessary communication open, and
they would frequently afford opportunities of
intercepting his Convoys. If there were none
there, he might advance with Security, leaving
Small Posts behind, and might draw his
Supplies regularly and without interruption,
than which nothing could tend more to facilitate
his operations and give them Success." He
In the volumes of correspondence, one can further added that any militia beyond that
see the Commander-in-Chief directing, in a needed for the harassment of rear, flank, and
clearly Fabian way, the 1777 campaign which
supply might properly be added to the front.
led to the surrender of Burgoyne. As everyone
knows, "Gentleman ~ o h n n y "- Burgoyne spent
This letter of August 16 to the governor of
most of that summer marching through
New
York over the use of his militia shows
wilderness from Ticonderoga towards Albany,
only to fall short of his goal and surrender plainly the Commander-in-Chief's clear Fabian
to General Gates Oct. 14. Gates, of course, understanding. Much more important, though,
received the credit, even though he had never is that it contains the instructions which
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trapped Burgoyne and forced his surrender, as
we will shortly see. A similar letter was sent
on August 20 to General Gates, noting that
Gates could expect Daniel Morgan's Riflemen
on the 28th, and the regiments of Colonels
Cortland and Livingston "within a few days;
with these Reinforcements, besides the Militia
under General Lincoln . . . I am in hopes you
will find yourself equal to stop the progress
of Mr. Burgoyne and by cutting of his supplies
of Provision & ca. to render his Situation very
Ineligible."
Burgoyne's march shows neatly what the
Fabian treatment can do to an army. He left
Ticonderoga with 9,500 men, July 6. After a
month or so, he was forced t o send his left
wingoff to Bennington for supplies. On
August 16, the same date a s Washington's
letter to Governor Clinton of New York
opposing a use of militia in frontal opposition,
John Stark's New Hampshire militiamen set
upon and destroyed this wing. The governor
and the local generals thus will have received
Washington's advice and this immediately
illustration of the wisdom of it simultaneously.
Burgoyne, now with 6,000 men, met the
enlarged American force, about 6,000 strong,
under the command of Gates 30 miles north
of Albany September 19. Burgoyne attacked,
according to British sources ;Morgan's Riflemen
struck first according to the American sources.
All agree that the British force took heavy
losses. Burgoyne fortified his positions a t the
site of the battle, the clearing of Freeman's
Farm, and waited for reinforcements. Almost
three weeks later, during which time the British
force and morale were being diminished by
constant American raids, he attempted a
break-out. This was repulsed. Benedict Arnold
then took over and led the counter-attack
which captured one of Burgoyne's two
fortifications, and gave the victory in this
engagement, called the Battle of Saratoga, or
perhaps more accurately, the second battle of
Freeman's Farm, to the American side,
October 7. But this was not yet the complete
victory which "The Battle of Saratoga" is
now thought of. It is the difference between

winning an engagement and forcing your
opponent's complete surrender : Burgoyne still
had a potentially effective force of 2,000 men,
with which he retreated from the field, to
Saratoga. But his path to retreat was not clear;
there was this militia in the way, in accordance
with Washington's advice on its placement.
He had nowhere to go, and on October 14
asked Gates for terms of surrender. Given the
Fabian background, one can see that directly
behind Arnold, who deserves credit for forcing
the retreat, comes Washington, who deserves
credit for the strategy which made the retreat
impossible. Gates, "the victor of Saratoga," was
simply there as the officer-in-charge to
surrender to.
This, of course, is the victory that led to
the French Alliance, which would in the end
mean the entrapment of Cornwallis a t Yorktown
as soon as the French fleet arrived. But
meanwhile, an army had to be kept together,
and Washington had to avoid losing it all
between '77 and Yorktown ('81). This required
constant and alert practice of what became
conscious Fabianism. As we have noted, the
reinforcements sent to Gates were intended
for rendering Burgoyne's "Situation very
Inelligible." In the face of a superior force
overseas from its home base, this was the
appropriate response. The basic principle which Gates never grasped-is
simply to
survive as an armed force until opportunity
permits delivery of an annoying or decisive
blow. Failure to survive obviously meant you
permitted something to become critical and
were defeated. Period. Survival meant ultimate
victory. This was, I learn from military
historian Ira Gruber the heart of French
strategic thinking of the day. Its nature could
not go unrecognized everywhere, nor for much
longer. Washington often sought written advice
from the Generals in camp. Here, in the
translation of Colonel $ohn Laurens, is the
response of a recent arrival which will also
serve to identify for us a contemporary
understanding of Roman military history :
"What we ought to propose to ourselves, is to
defend the country inch by inch, . . . to hinder
the enemy from making himself master of it,
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consequently never to receive him but when
we are protected by a natural or artificial
fortification, in other words, to carry on what
is styled a defensive war. This is our true part
and it is so obvious that in Europe, all Military
men and even those who are not so, suppose
this to be our Conduct - If the Americans
could consult the modern daily publications,
they should there find that the model offered
to General Washington is principally Fabius,
that wise Roman who ruined Hannibal by
refusing to fight him in plain. Fabius however
commanded Romans, but these Romans had
been thrice defeated, they were disheartened,
dreaded the enemy, and were nearly reduced
to the condition of new and unformed troops.
The Consul conducted himself accordingly,
avoided general Battles, kept himself on the
defensive, always occupying strong positions
and where the enemy could not attack him but
with considerable disadvantage - it is true that
this kind of war was not approved of a t Rome ;
Men of leisure who loved to be amused by great
events, men of impetuous dispositions, men
whose discernment was not sufficient to judge
of what circumstances required, in a word the
particular enemies of the consul, turned him
into ridicule, affixed to him insulting surnames,
but the sage General was unmoved by them.
He knew that after all, the event would
determine his reputation in the world -he
therefore invariably pursued his plan, and by
his firmness which was crowned with success,
he merited the appellation of Savior of Rome."
I t was never a case, though, of advising the
General to model himself after Fabius. This
was simply recognition that he was Fabius,
and a use of Livy to encourage him to remain so.
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Having 2,000 militia, his own corps of
nearly a thousand light infantry, and 40
dragoons with which to defend Virginia from
Cornwallis' 4,500 British regulars, he did a
volte-face from his first impulse to "risk
something," realizing his own ruin would be
the ruin of the State, His May 24 '81 letter
to the Commander-in-Chief is illuminating :
"Were I to fight a battle I should be cut to
pieces, the militia dispersed, and the arms lost.
Were I to decline fighting, the country would
think itself given up. I am therefore determined
to skirmish, but not to engage too far, and
particularly to take care against their immense
and excellent body of horse, whom the militia
fear as they would so many wild beasts." The
Fabius-Hannibal parallel abides, even to the
elephants. But that is an aside. LaFayette was
now twenty-four, and Sir Henry Clinton, British
Commander-in-Chief for North America,
easily assumed that his man in the south,
Cornwallis, would destroy the youth. Cornwallis
himself thought to nail him. "The boy will not
escape me," he said. But the boy would not
be pinned down, even when Cornwallis took
the capital, flushing Governor Jefferson. The
boy on that occasisn managed to outmarch
Cornwallis to interpose his force between
Cornwallis and the state arsenal, and then to
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dog Cornwallis about the state, changing his After putting him in charge of the territory
camp daily, sometimes even marching on between the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers,
Cornwallis' rear, sometime even attacking, Washington advised : "You will remember that
never utterly committing himself. Finally your detachment is a very valuable one, and
abandoning thoughts of catching LaFayette t h a t a n y a c c i d e n t h a p p e n i n g t o i t would
and looking instead to the comfort and health be a very severe blow to this army. You will
of his men, Cornwallis settled in a t Yorktown therefore use every possible precaution for its
during the first week of August. And LaFayette, security and to guard against a surprise. No
though he had left Virginians near panic by attempt should be made, nor anything risked,
not "stopping" Cornwallis, had survived in without the greatest prospect of success, and
force to be, upon the arrival of Admiral de with every reasonable advantage on your side.
Grasse and General Washington, part of the
"I shall not point out any precise position to
three-lever nutcracker which forced the
you; but shall leave it to your discretion to
surrender of Cornwallis a t Yorktown.
take such posts occasionally as shall appear to
He had remained a t all times 20-30 miles you best adapted to the purpose of your
distant from his intending captor, doing the detachment. I n General, I would observe, t h a t
same thing he ordered his subordinates: a stationary post i s unadvisable, a s it gives
"Whatever road the enemy take, you will please t h e e n e m y a n opportunity o f knozving your
to proceed in that route, and, if opportunity position, and concerting plans successfully
o f f e r s , a t t a c k t h e m . " H e h a d b e c o m e against you. In case of any offensive movement
strategically, in fact, Washington's altera against this army, you will keep yourself in
persona, and, a s "A Gentleman in LaFayette's such a state as to have easy communication
Army" wrote to the Baltimore paper of July, with it, and a t the same time harass the enemy's
'81, "was Fabius to Cornwallis's Hannibal." advance" (May 17, 1778).
L a F a y e t t e k n e w consciously w h a t h e w a s
In 1781, from September 28 to October 17,
doing. So had his commanding officer Greene,
who had earlier honored Cornwallis by naming the outcome required von Steuben's experience
him a Hannibal, and had done rather well as a t conducting a seige, but reaching those
a Fabius himself. The word was out. And, t w e n t y d a y s a t Y o r k t o w n h a d r e q u i r e d
with de Grasse's decision to bring the French Washington's natural gifts a t being a Fabius
fleet t o Chesapeake Bay msking i t possible to for himself, and a t taking an impetuous boy
pen Cornwallis in Yorktown, rather than and turning him into another, and sticking to
Clinton in New York, the war was won as it for six years.
soon a s Washington succeeded in sneaking south
Though won, the war was not over, and
out of New York. He contrived to make the first
wouldn't
be until the treaty was signed in
ten days of the 400-mile march to Yorktown
September
of 1783. During this entire interval
look exactly like an impending attack upon
Clinton
was
in command of an undefeated
Staten Island from the New Jersey shore.
British
army
in New York. The situation
Artfully and completely deceived, Clinton finally
required
that
Washington keep an inactive
pursued too late to be of use: he was apprised
army
under
control
for two more years, and
of the surrender en route.
finally manage to disband it without any money
How was i t that the experienced Cornwallis to send it home with. The problems were worthy
could sit still long enough to become encircled, of another Roman military and civil genius out
and "the boy," through the entire summer, of the pages of Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch,
could not be trapped? Part of the answer is That would be Cincinnatus, but that's another
that Washington was the boy's Commander-in- story.
Chief. Have a look a t Washington's instructions
T . N. Winter
to Lafayette on the occasion of LaFayette's
first command after the non-invasion of Canada. University of Nabraska

